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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
The board of tax appeals has promulgated its rules for practice. The board
has decided that claims for refund are not properly a matter for consideration
of the board. This, of course, narrows the scope of the board’s activities
considerably. The ruling will probably be a disappointment to many tax
payers who had hoped that the board would be able to give consideration to
adjustments of all kinds, including refunds.
Several interesting treasury decisions have been issued. The following is a
brief summary of some of the rulings most recently issued:

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS

Value of stock March I, 1913, may be determined by proving value of
property of the corporation where there was no evidence to establish market
value on that date. Evidence of development expense incurred by the cor
poration subsequent to that date excluded as irrelevant (Carnill v. Lederer).
Salaries of general officers and employees of a contracting company reporting
on a completed contract basis, whose services are not definitely in connection
with the completion of any particular contracts, are deductible when paid or
incurred (Arr Rec 8367).
Amounts paid by building and loan association not exempt from tax, on full
paid certificates represent dividends and not interest (It 2052).
Engineering firms engaged in actual building operations may use completed
contract basis in accounting for taxable income (court decision in re Harrington).
Cancellation of debts to employees constitutes taxable income (It 2043).
Loss from fire resulting from explosion deductible, but damage by bomb not
resulting in fire held not deductible (It 2037).
Extension of time for payment of deficiency of income-tax under section
274 (g) of 1924 revenue act only applicable on assessments made on or after
June 2, 1924 (Mim. 3216).
(T. D. 3608.)
Income tax—Suit to restrain payment—Decision of court.
1. Injunction—Distraint—Section 3224, Revised Statutes.
Under the provisions of section 3224, revised statutes, interference by
injunctive process with an attempt of a collector of internal revenue to seize
complainant’s accounts and securities under warrant of distraint, for the pay
ment of an assessed tax, is not permissible.

2. Distraint—Limitation.
An allegation that a warrant of distraint is void because the tax and all
“suits and proceedings,’’ whether executive or judicial, are barred by the
five-year statute (section 250 (d), revenue act of 1921) does not give a court
jurisdiction to interfere by injunctive process with the collection of the tax by
warrant of distraint.
3. Case Followed.
Graham v. duPont (262 U. S. 234; T. D. 3486).
Treasury Department,
Office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Washington, D. C.
To collectors of internal revenue and others concerned:
The following decision of the United States district court for the southern
district of New York in the case of Lloyd W. Seaman v. Guaranty Trust Co.
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et al. and Frank K. Bowers, collector, is published for the information of inter
nal-revenue officers and others concerned.
D. H. Blair,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Approved June 25, 1924:
A. W. Mellon,
Secretary of the Treasury.
United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
Lloyd W. Seaman, complainant, v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, F. Clark
Thompson et al., composing the firm of Harvey Fisk & Sons, George A. Ellis,
jr., et al., composing the firm of E. F. Hutton & Co., and Frank K. Bowers,
defendants.
(June 7, 1924.)
Augustus N. Hand, District Judge: This is a suit to enjoin the defendants,
Guaranty Trust Co., Harvey Fisk & Sons and E. F. Hutton & Co., who hold
collateral securing complainant’s loans, from delivering the collateral to the
defendant Bowers, who has attempted to seize the same under a warrant of
distraint for an unpaid income-tax for the year 1916. The complainant filed
his return in 1917 and no claim is made by the government that it was fraudu
lent. Section 250 (d) of the revenue act of 1921 provides that:
. . . no suit or proceeding for the collection of any such tax due
under this act or under prior income, excess profits, or war profits tax
acts or of any taxes due under section 38 of such act of August 5, 1919,
shall be begun after the expiration of five years after the date when such
return was filed, but this shall not affect suits or proceedings begun at
the time of the passage of this act. . . .
The complainant insists that the warrant of distraint is void because the tax
and all suits and proceedings, whether departmental or otherwise, are barred by
the five years statute. The collector replies that, irrespective of whether the
tax is finally due, it has been assessed and his operations in collecting it by
distraint are not affected because of the provision of section 3224 of the revised
statutes that “ no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax shall be maintained in any court.”
This court has already, under the authority of Graham v. duPont (262 U. S.
254), dismissed a suit by this complainant to restrain the collection of this very
tax, and its action has been affirmed by the court of appeals. The words of
Judge Mayer’s opinion upon the appeal that this complainant “might present
his contentions in respect of the statutory bar when and if he pays the tax or
when and if the tax shall be collected” seem to point to an action at law to
recover the tax as the only remedy.
In view of the authorities I cannot hold that any interference by injunctive
process with the attempt of the collector to seize complainant’s securities is
permissible. I understand it to be conceded by the complainant that no injunc
tion can be granted against the collector, and he has consented to a dismissal
of the suit as against him. An injunction against the defendants would in effect
impale them upon one or the other of the horns of a dilemma. If they obeyed
the injunction, they would be bound to resist a public officer who was proceeding
to execute a warrant of distraint after an assessment. If they did not obey the
injunction, they would be in contempt of this court. A suit for interpleader
would seem to be impossible because it involves for its very enforcement an
injunction against the collector, which has already been held unlawful under
substantially the facts of the present case.
The decision of Judge Carpenter in the recent case of Peacock v. Lehmann,
referred to in complainant’s brief, does not seem in accord with the decision of
the supreme court in Graham v. duPont, supra, and the court of appeals of
the circuit in the case of Seaman v. Bowers.
The taking of any securities, or proceeds of securities, by the collector from
the defendants would certainly not be a voluntary act on their part, and the
holders of the securities if they were compelled by vis major to part with the
property could not be regarded as converters. However illegal may be the
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action of the collector, his seizure as a public officer would seem to be a protec
tion to the holders of the securities. I am not suggesting that the seizure by the
collector is not a trespass upon the rights of the complainant but, however that
may be, the latter has a remedy or remedies at law to which, under the decisions,
he seems to be confined.
The motion for a preliminary injunction is denied, and the suit is, by consent,
dismissed as against the defendant Bowers.
(T. D. 3609.)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1916—Decision of Supreme Court.
1. Income—Capital Gain—Sale of Stock—Exchange of Stock.
Where a corporation transfers all of its property to a new corporation
organized under the laws of the same state, with substantially the same name
and for the conduct of the same business, having a capital stock five times as
large as the old company, and stockholders of the old company sell one-half
of their shares of stock in the old company at $150 a share and exchange the
other half for stock in the new company, income is received based upon the
value of the stock sold, but no income is received from the exchange of stock
in the old company for stock in the new.
2. Cases Distinguished and Followed.
Cases of United States v. Phellis (257 U. S. 158, T. D. 3270), Rockefeller
v. United States (257 U. S. 176, T. D. 3271), and Cullinan v. Walker (262 U. S.
134, T. D. 3508), distinguished; Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S. 189, T. D.
3010), Towne v. Eisner (245 U. S. 418, T. D. 2634), Southern Pacific Co. v.
Lowe (247 U. S. 330, T. D. 2730), and Gulf Oil Corporation v. Llewellyn (248
U. S. 71, T. D. 2783), followed.
Treasury Department,
Office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Washington, D. C.
To Collectors of Internal Revenue and Others Concerned:
The following decision of the United States supreme court in the cases of
Harry H. Weiss, collector of internal revenue, v. Louis Stearn, and Harry H.
Weiss, collector of internal revenue, v. John G. White, is published for the in
formation of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
C. R. Nash,
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Approved June 27, 1924:
A. W. Mellon,
Secretary of the Treasury.

United States. Nos. 262 and 263.
October Term, 1923.
Harry H. Weiss, collector of internal revenue, petitioner, v. Louis StearnHarry H. Weiss, collector of internal revenue, petitioner, v. John G. White.

Supreme Court

262.
263.

of the

Writs of certiorari to the United States circuit court of appeals for the
sixth circuit.

(May 26, 1924.)

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondents brought separate actions to recover money which they alleged
petitioner unlawfully demanded of them as income-tax. The question for our
decision is this: Did they, by the transactions hereinafter detailed, dispose with
profit of all or, as they maintain, of only half their interests in the National
Acme Manufacturing Co., within the income provisions, revenue act of 1916?
(Ch. 465, 39 Stat. 756, 757.) Both courts below upheld their claim and gave
judgments for appropriate refunds.
Under a definite written agreement the following things were done:
(A) Respondents and other owners delivered duly indorsed certificates repre
senting the entire capital stock ($5,000,000) of the National Acme Manufactur
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ing Co., incorporated under laws of Ohio—the old corporation—to the Cleveland
Trust Co., as depositary. Messrs. Eastman, Dillon & Co., deposited $7,500,000
with the same trust company. Representatives of both classes of depositors
thereupon incorporated in Ohio the National Acme Co.—the new corporation—
with $25,000,000 authorized capital stock and powers similar to those of the old
corporation. Pursuing the definite purpose for which it was organized, the new
corporation purchased and took over the entire property, assets and business of
the old one, assuming all outstanding contracts and liabilities, and in payment
therefor issued to the trust company its entire authorized capital stock. It con
tinued to operate the acquired business under the former management and the
old corporation was dissolved.
(B) The trust company delivered to Eastman, Dillon & Co. certificates for
half the new stock—$12,500,000. To the owners of the old stock—to each his
pro rata part—it delivered certificates representing the remaining half, together
with the $7,500,000 cash received from Eastman, Dillon & Co. The owner of
each $100 of old stock thus received $150 cash, also $250 of new stock represent
ing an interest in the property and business half as large as he had before.
Prior to the specified transactions his interest in the enterprise was 100/5,000,000; thereafter it became 250/25,000,000, or 50/5,000,000.
The collector ruled that each old stockholder sold his entire holding, and
assessed respondent accordingly for resulting profits. Adopting a different
view, the courts below held that he really sold half for cash and exchanged the
remainder, without gain, for the same proportionate interest in the transferred
corporate assets and business.
We agree with the conclusion reached below. The practical result of the
things done was a transfer of the old assets and business, without increase or
diminution or material change of general purpose, to the new corporation; a
disposal for cash by each stockholder of half his interest therein; and an
exchange of the remainder for new stock representing the same proportionate
interest in the enterprise. Without doubt every stockholder became liable
for the tax upon any profits which he actually realized by receiving the cash
payment. If by selling the remainder he hereafter receives a segregated profit,
that also will be subject to taxation.
Petitioner relies upon United States v. Phellis (257 U. S. 156), and Rockefeller
v. United States (id. 176); also Cullinan v. Walker (262 U. S. 134), which followed
them. As the result of transactions disclosed in the Phellis and Rockefeller
cases, certain corporate assets not exceeding accumulated surplus were segre
gated and passed to individual stockholders. The value of the segregated
thing so received was held to constitute taxable income. Cullinan’s gain
resulted from a dividend in liquidation actually distributed in the stock of a
holding company incorporated under the laws of a foreign State, not organized
for the purpose of carrying on the old business, and which held no title to the
original assets.
Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S. 189) gave great consideration to the nature of
income and stock dividends. It pointed out that, within the meaning of the
sixteenth amendment, income from capital is gain severed therefrom and re
ceived by the taxpayer for his separate use; that the interest of the stockholder
is a capital one and stock certificates but evidence of it; that for purposes of
taxation where a stock dividend is declared, the essential and controlling fact is
that the recipient receives nothing out of the company’s assets for his separate
use and benefit. The conclusion was that, “having regard to the very truth
of the matter, to substance and not to form, he has received nothing that
answers the definition of income within the meaning of the sixteenth amend
ment.”
Applying the general principles of Eisner v. Macomber, it seems clear that if
the National Acme Manufacturing Co. had increased its capital stock to
$25,000,000 and then declared a stock dividend of 400 per cent, the stock
holders would have received no gain—their proportionate interest would have
remained the same as before. If upon the transfer of its entire property and
business for the purpose of reorganization and future conduct the old corpora
tion had actually received the entire issue of new stock and had then distributed
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this pro rata among its stockholders, their ultimate rights in the enterprise
would have continued substantially as before—the capital assets would have
remained unimpaired and nothing would have gone therefrom to any stock
holder for his separate benefit. The value of his holdings would not have
changed, and he would have retained the same essential rights in respect of
the assets.
We can not conclude that mere change for purposes of reorganization in the
technical ownership of an enterprise under circumstances like those here dis
closed, followed by issuance of new certificates, constitutes gain separated
from the original capital interest. Something more is necessary—something
which gives the stockholder a thing really different from what he theretofore
had. Towne v. Eisner (245 U. S. 418); Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe (247 U. S.
33o); Gulf Oil Corporation v. Lewellyn (248 U. S. 71). The sale of part of the
new stock and distribution of the proceeds did not affect the nature of the
unsold portion; when distributed this did not in truth represent any gain.
Considering the entire arrangement, we think it amounted to a financial
reorganization under which each old stockholder retained half of his interest
and disposed of the remainder. Questions of taxation must be determined
by viewing what was actually done, rather than the declared purpose of the
participants; and when applying the provisions of the sixteenth amendment
and income laws enacted thereunder we must regard matters of substance and
not mere form. Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissent on the ground that
the case falls within the rule declared in Cullinan v. Walker (262 U. S. 134).
(T. D. 3610, June 27, 1924.)
Capital stock tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.

1. Capital stock tax—Excise tax.
The capital stock tax imposed by section 1000 of the revenue act of 1918 is
an excise or privilege tax as distinguished from a property tax.
2. Statutory construction—“Capital stock.”
The term “capital stock” both in the courts and the financial world has not
assumed a fixed and determinate meaning identifying its use as applicable to
shares of stock of a corporation as opposed to accumulated assets.
3. Same—“Fair average value.”
The phrase “fair average value of its capital stock” as used in the revenue
act of 1918 manifests an intent to prescribe an equitable basis for the assessment
of the tax. "Fair” means “just”—“average” indicates “apportionment.”
Congress used the term fair average value of the capital stock to formulate a
basis for the computation of the tax that would allow the commissioner in its
assessment to take into consideration the resources of the corporation, its
assets and liabilities, its entire possessions actually at work to produce earnings,
the instrumentalities available to its management as a going concern and, from
the sum total thus ascertained, strike a fair average value, a value fair to the
corporation and to the government.
4. Same—“Estimating”—“Surplus and undivided profits shall be
included.”
The word “estimating” carries with it the idea of valuation rather than of
mathematical apportionment and the phrase “surplus and undivided profits
shall be included” discloses a purpose to use assets as one factor in arriving at
the value of capital stock. When congress expressly included surplus and
undivided profits in the estimation of the capital stock of a corporation, it
necessarily excluded resort to the market value of the shares of stock of the
corporation as the only basis of assessing the excise tax.
5. Cases Followed.
The cases of Central Union Trust Co. v. Edwards (282 Fed. 1008, T. D.
3359, 287 Fed. 324, T. D. 3438) and Hecht v. Malley (U. S. Sup. Ct., T. D.
2595) followed.
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The following decision of the United States court of claims in the case of
Ray Consolidated Copper Co. v. United States is published for the information of
internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
Court of Claims of the United States
Ray Consolidated Copper Co., a corporation, v. United States.
(Decided May 19, 1924.)
Booth, judge, delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a suit to recover the sum of $21,240.30 alleged to be due the plaintiff
company because of an alleged revenue tax assessed and collected by the com
missioner of internal revenue under the provisions of section 1000, title X, of
the revenue act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1126), which reads as follows:
Sec. 1000. (a) That on and after July 1,1918, in lieu of the tax imposed
by the first subdivision of section 406 of the revenue act of 1918—
(1) Every domestic corporation shall pay annually a special excise tax
with respect to carrying on or doing business, equivalent to $1 for each
$1,000 of so much of the fair average value of its capital stock for the
preceding year ending June 30 as is in excess of $5,000. In estimating the
value of capital stock the surplus and undivided profits shall be included.
(2) Every foreign corporation shall pay annually a special excise tax
with respect to carrying on or doing business in the United States, equiva
lent to $1 for each $1,000 of the average amount of capital employed in the
transaction of its business in the United States during the preceding year
ending June thirtieth.
(b) In computing the tax in the case of insurance companies such
deposits and reserve funds as they are required by law or contract to
maintain or hold for the protection of or payment to or apportionment
among policyholders shall not be included.
(c) The taxes imposed by this section shall not apply in any year to any
corporation which was not engaged in business (or in the case of a foreign
corporation not engaged in business in the United States) during the
preceding year ending June 30, nor to any corporation enumerated in
section 231. The taxes imposed by this section shall apply to mutual
insurance companies, and in the case of every such domestic company the
tax shall be equivalent to $1 for each $1,000 of the excess over $5,000 of the
sum of its surplus or contingent reserves maintained for the general use of
the business and any reserves the net additions to which are included in net
income under the provisions of Title II, as of the close of the preceding
accounting period used by such company for purposes of making its
income-tax return: provided, That in the case of a foreign mutual insurance
company the tax shall be equivalent to $1 for each $1,000 of the same
proportion of the sum of such surplus and reserves which the reserve fund
upon business transacted within the United States is of the total reserve
upon all business transaction as of the close of the preceding accounting
period used by such company for purposes of making its income-tax return.
(d) Section 257 shall apply to all returns filed with the commissioner for
purposes of the tax imposed, by this section.
The Ray Consolidated Copper Co. is a domestic corporation incorporated
under the laws of the state of Maine. The company is engaged on a large scale
in the general mining, milling and smelting of copper ore. On July 30, 1920,
the plaintiff company filed with the collector of internal revenue for the second
district of New York, on forms prescribed and in pursuance of regulations
adopted by the commissioner of internal revenue, its return upon which capital
stock taxes in accord with the foregoing statute were to be assessed. Exhibit B
discloses the average sale value of 537,938 shares of the plaintiff’s 1,577,179
shares of common stock outstanding and traded in on the New York stock
exchange during the calendar year .1919. The computation given and the
results obtained were reached by taking the mean of the high and low sales for
each month of the calendar year. By this process an average value of $22,067
is accorded to each share, and multiplied by the whole number of shares issued
and outstanding gives the total number of shares a resultant value of $34,803,-

293

The Journal of Accountancy
608.99. Having then reached this claimed demonstrable conclusion the plain
tiff company, in a separate note attached to its return, contended that the
method employed was and is within the terms of the capital-stock tax act and
the intent of congress when the tax was laid upon “the fair average value of its
capital stock for the preceding year.” A cheque for $34,798 in payment of the
tax according to its contention accompanied the return.
The commissioner of internal revenue declined to accede to plaintiff’s con
tention, and instead assessed and collected the tax on the basis of the net assets
of the corporation. The commissioner gave full credit to all the valuation esti
mates of the plaintiff with respect to its corporate property save one. The
basic capital of the corporation is an extensive and valuable copper mine in
Arizona. The plaintiff returned this property as worth $8,657,620.28. The
commissioner enhanced its worth to $32,282,993.56. The commissioner’s con
clusion respecting this item of mining property was predicated exclusively upon
a return previously made by the plaintiff, where for the basis of ascertaining
income-taxes the corporation itself valued the mine at $127,417,291. Subse
quently, by the application of a depletion allowance formula put in force by the
commissioner, and satisfactory to the plaintiff, the value of the mine was fixed
at $93,678,245.28. Allowing the plaintiff its conceded ratio of depletion and
extending the same over a period of six years from March 1,1913, to December
31, 1919, the commissioner finally fixed the mining property as worth on the
latter date $32,282,993.56 for the purposes of capital-stock assessment. The
plaintiff in this litigation makes no protest against the proceedings of the
commissioner referable to the accuracy of his computation, but the challenge
is to the method employed. Therefore it is conceded that if the commissioner
was within his legal rights in assessing and collecting the tax upon the fair
average value of its net assets, fixed by him after allowing all just credits and
debits of $55,828,541.66, it may not recover the alleged overpayment of $21,
240.30 with interest thereon, for which this suit is brought, the plaintiff having
paid the same under protest.
It is apparent from the stipulated findings and what has just been said that
the single issue involved herein is the construction of the section of the statute
authorizing the imposition of the tax. The plaintiff insists that the fair average
value of its shares of stock “based upon bona fide transactions on a large scale
in the open market establishes the value of its capital stock for the purpose of
the tax,” the defendant, on the other hand, insisting that the term “capital
stock” as used in the act has no such restricted meaning; that clearly within the
intendment of the statute congress was imposing an excise tax on domestic cor
porations as going concerns, a tax on the privilege of conducting business as such,
and directed the admeasurement of the same upon the value of such a privilege,
ascertainable from the net value of its holdings, its possessions, the things tan
gible and intangible which concentrated into a single unit are fundamentally its
capital stock, from which earnings and dividends are expected to flow. As
aptly stated, “the tools,” the instrumentalities available to the management in
the prosecution of the corporate enterprise; that no precise, unyielding method,
resting upon a fixed standard of evaluation, such as the average market value
of the corporation’s shares of stock, is intended by the term “capital stock,”
but that, on the contrary, the generality of the tax, the differing and manifold
complexities of corporate organization, the character of business involved,
clearly impart a legislative intention to tax “the entire potentiality of the
corporation to profit by the exercise of its corporate franchise.”
There are many cases in the books where this identical controversy has been
involved. They illustrate with preciseness the seeming flexibility of the mean
ing of the term “capital stock.” In both the courts and the financial world the
term itself has not assumed a fixed and determinate significance capable of
identifying its use as alone applicable to shares of stock of a corporation as
opposed to accumulated assets of the same. As a matter of fact, it is frequently
used in legislation to indicate one or the other. It may, we think, be said—at
least the adjudications of the state courts are almost uniform upon this point—
that in the imposition of property taxes laid upon the capital stock of corpora
tions the term is held to mean the assets of the corporation, its real possessions
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which the corporation uses and employs in its corporate activities.—Pacific Hotel
Co. v. Lieb (83 Ill. 602); Chicago Union Traction Co. v. State Board of Equaliza
tion (112 Fed. 607); Henderson Bridge Co. v. Commonwealth (99 Ky. 625; 166
U. S. 150); Security Co. v. Hartford (61 Conn. 80-101); State v. Duluth Gas &
Water Co. (76 Minn. 96); People v. Coleman (126 N. Y. 433); Adams Express
Co. v. Ohio (166 U. S. 85); First National Bank v. Douglas Co. (124 Wis. 15).
In excise taxing statutes where there are no qualifying terms indicative of an
express limitation of the term “capital stock” the ambiguity thus arising is
resolvable only by recourse to the usual and elementary principles of statutory
construction. What did congress intend when it used the term as it did in this
particular law?
The imposition of excise taxes, especially corporate excise taxes, is not a new
form of revenue legislation. It has been frequently resorted to by both the
state and nation, and in the course of such legislation the value of the corpora
tion’s shares of stock, its assets, its net and gross income, etc., have been em
ployed as the standard of measuring the tax. As a matter of fact, the factor of
its ascertainment rests in the discretion of the legislature enacting the law.—
Spreckles Sugar Co. v. McClain (192 U. S. 397); Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co. (220
U. S. 107).
By the act of June 13, 1898 (30 Stat. 448), congress imposed a special excise
tax upon the banking business of the country. A mere reading of the law seems
sufficient to confirm the assertion that its policy was rigidly limited to the com
putation of the same upon the basis of capital, surplus and undivided profits.
In other words, the tax was to be measured by the net assets of the bank. The
act of October 22, 1914 (38 Stat. 745) continued the banker’s tax of 1898, with
changed provisions as to the amount of the imposition, but still adhering to the
legislative policy of measuring the tax in accord with the net assets of the bank.
Leather Manufacturers National Bank v. Treat (128 Fed. 262).
In 1916 congress adopted a more comprehensive policy in the matter of excise
tax legislation, and instead of limiting the tax to bankers broadened the scope
of the enactment and included all domestic corporations, joint-stock companies,
and associations organized for profit and having a capital stock represented by
shares. The tax was to be measured upon the basis of “the fair value of its
capital stock, and in estimating the value of capital stock the surplus and undi
vided profits shall be included.” The act of 1918, which followed the general
policy of the act of 1916, substituted as the basis for computing the tax “the
fair average value of its capital stock” instead of the “fair value” of the same.
An analysis of this legislation, considered in the light of its inception, as ap
pears from the bankers taxing statute, clearly imports a legislative policy to
measure the excise taxes provided for on the basis of the assets of the corpora
tion. It was not until 1916, when the field was broadened and all domestic
corporations came within the scope of the capital-stock tax law, that doubt in
this respect could possibly arise.
In the case of Central Union Trust Co. v. Edwards (282 Fed. 1008), a case
involving the construction of the act of 1916, the plaintiff contended that "capi
tal stock” in association with the other provisions of the law clearly meant paidin capital, surplus and undivided profits, less liabilities, or, in other words, net
assets. It so happened in this particular case that the market value of the
corporation’s shares of stock was largely in excess of its book value, due to
large and most attractive dividend distributions for some years. The collector
of internal revenue, ignoring this contention, assessed and collected the tax
upon the basis of the corporation as a going concern, including in his estimate
of the factors, both tangible and intangible, which added to and were possessed
by the corporation in the course of its going business. In other words, the col
lector computed the tax upon the “fair value of total capital stock” without
limiting the computation to net assets. Manifestly this resulted in a largely
increased tax. The district judge, in a written opinion, sustained the collector
and was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit in
287 Fed. 324.
The reasoning of the court in both opinions cited above follows the channel
marked out by the supreme and state courts in construing corporate excise-tax
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laws. Emphasis is put upon the character of the tax, an exaction demanded for
a privilege, an imposition laid upon the legal entity known as a corporation and
measured by its resources, “the entire potentiality of the corporation to profit
by the exercise of its corporate franchise,” and not upon property emanating
therefrom but belonging to individuals.
When the congress used the expression “the fair average value of its capital
stock,” as it did in the act of 1918, it manifested an intent to prescribe an-equi
table basis for the assessment of the tax, a design to apply justly a tax exaction
which, because of its general extent, in pursuance of the taxing policy adopted,
was incapable of restraint within rigid rules for ascertainment. “Fair” means
“just”; “average” indicates apportionment. It is not difficult to obtain an
average value, and it would appear as a logical inference that the interposition
of the adjective “fair” was notice that in the adoption of “capital stock” as the
basis factor for computing the tax it was not always possible to fix its average
value, and therefore some discretion, some leeway, must be granted, some room
allowed, so that the burden imposed would fall with measurable equality upon
all corporations taxed. “Fair value” means market value ordinarily, the
amount which sellers are willing to take and buyers to give, and, if a fair, open
market were always available, it may well be that the fair average value of a
corporation’s capital stock is the average of its market value. But the vast
majority of domestic corporations do not list their shares of stock upon the New
York or local stock exchanges. In fact, an insignificant number do. Many in
corporated insurance companies have no shares of stock; others have both
preferred and common; in hundreds of corporations the stock is closely held and
rarely, if ever, sold. So that it seems to us that congress was endeavoring in
the use of the term “fair average value of the capital stock” to formulate a
basis for the computation of the tax that would allow the commissioner in its
assessment to take into consideration the resources of the corporation, its assets
and liabilities, its entire possessions actually at work to produce earnings, the
instrumentalities available to its management as a going concern, and, from the
sum total thus ascertained, strike a fair average value, a value fair to the cor
poration and to the Government. As said by Mr. Justice Brewer in Powers v.
etroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co. (201 U. S. 543, 561):
D
Again, the tax is to “be estimated upon the last annual report of the
corporation.” While such report might be expected to include not merely
the property belonging to the corporation but also the number and names
of the stockholders and the number of shares held by each, and possibly
also the amount paid in by each, yet the word “estimated” carries with it
the idea of valuation rather than of mathematical apportionment, it sug
gests that the property reported by the corporation is to be the basis upon
which the assessors shall make their valuation, so that the tax is “esti
mated” upon the property rather than fixed by mere process of multipli
cation or division. . . . Under those circumstances we are of the opin
ion that the tax provided for by section 9 is a tax upon the property of the
corporation and not a tax upon the shares of stock held by the shareholders.
If, as contended for, the market value of the shares of stock is the fundamental
and only basis for measuring the tax when available, the word “fair’’ is decidedly
meaningless. No difficulties present themselves in ascertaining the real, mathe
matical average market value of the same.
Again, in 1918 the capital stock act contains an express provision: “In esti
mating the value of capital stock the surplus and undivided profits shall be
included.” (Italics ours.) Congress during the whole course of excise-tax
legislation has persistently and continuously inserted this provision in connection
with the term “capital stock.” Assuredly it may not be said that under any
circumstances this clause is to be ignored. It is, indeed, the one plain and
unambiguous provision which points out a definite, inflexible factor for entering
into the estimate of capital stock. "Shall be included” is the language of the
statute. Obviously, when given effect it precludes the idea of earnings of the
corporations as furnishing the basis of computation for the tax. It precludes a
consideration of profits and discloses an intended purpose to use assets—at least
assets represented by surplus and undivided profits—as one factor in arriving at
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the value of capital stock. But it is said that this provision serves a dual pur
pose. It furnishes a method for ascertaining the value of shares of stock when
no market value of the same is available, and it prevents the commissioner from
taking the par value of the shares in arriving at his estimate. There is no lan
guage in the statute which warrants us in dealing with alternatives. The
difficulties in the administration of the law are not before the court for correction.
It is no concern of ours whether the market value of shares of stock reflect the
paid-in value of the authorized capital and the surplus and undivided profits or
not. The law says, and plainly says, that surplus and undivided profits shall be
included in concluding an estimate of capital stock, and it may not be legally
administered without their consideration. If the clause was designed to pre
clude resort to par value, it signally fails in effectiveness, if market value of the
shares of stock, when available, is the single standard, for innumerable shares of
corporate stock are quoted for years on the stock market and freely offered at
less than their par value.
When congress expressly included surplus and undivided profits in the estima
tion of the capital stock of a corporation it necessarily excluded resort to the
market value of the shares of stock of the corporation, even when available, as
the one and only basis of assessing an excise tax against the same and intention
ally predicated the assessment of the tax upon an asset basis.—Home Savings
Bank v. Des Moines (205 U. S. 503).
Some things said and words used during a running but not prolonged interro
gation of the chairman of the committee in charge of the bill in the house of
representatives, just prior to its passage, lend countenance to the plaintiff’s
insistence. Taken as a whole, however, it is more impressive as an exposition
of opinion as to the detail of administration rather than a construction of the
law. In any event what was said is not sufficiently explicit to turn the issue in
this case. No express meaning was definitely given to the term “ capital stock’’
differentiating it from shares of stock.
The commissioner’s administration of the law and the regulations promul
gated by him in no wise militate against its uniform application. Corporate
organization covers every form of business enterprise, and if we are correct in
our view as to the meaning of capital stock, it is manifestly impossible to pre
scribe a set rule for its ascertainment in each particular instance. The plaintiff
company’s organization and business activity illustrate the manifold difficulties.
Like many other corporations dependent for prosperity upon extracting ele
ments from the earth, its capital stock is subject to depletion and fluctuation.
Therefore it is apparent that what may reflect the average value of capital stock
as applicable to one class of corporations may be wholly inapplicable to others
of a different character and engaged in a wholly different business. The uni
form measure of the tax is the fair average value of the capital stock, and if the
regulations and assessments made by the commissioner result in disclosing the
fair average value, it may not be said to be without uniformity because the
exact, unyielding basis is not employed in every instance. The plaintiff’s con
tention, if conceded, would not remove the contingent aspect of regulations
necessary to administer the law with uniformity or simplify its administration.
The facts in the case of the Central Union Trust Co. v. Edwards, supra, demon
strate the situation. The average market value of the trust company’s shares
of stock was $788.75 each, the book value $400 each. So that two corpora
tions, capitalized at the same amount, paying the same dividends, in one case,
where market value of its shares of stock is available, would be taxed on the
basis of $788.75 for each share, and in the other, where market value is not avail
able, on the basis of $400 per share; and this situation was not unusual during
the war. In other words, if plaintiff is correct, the tax is computed in some
cases upon the average market value of the corporation’s shares of stock, never
less than par, and in others upon the assets of the corporation. Whatever
else may be said, it is difficult to believe that congress intended capital stock
to mean shares of stock predicated upon market value in one instance and
upon asset value in another, differentiating the two by the interposition of sales
only.

297

The Journal of Accountancy
Capital stock and shares of stock owned by an individual have, and always
have had, a distinct meaning. How simple it would have been for congress to
have used the term ‘‘shares of stock” or “shares of capital stock” instead of
“capital stock,” if it intended the former. If it was not contemplated by con
gress to employ the assets of the corporation to measure the tax, why did it use
apt words to indicate so? It had before it the act of 1916 containing a descrip
tive provision, viz, “haying a capital stock represented by shares.” It was
familiar with the legislative policy of taxing capital employed and used in corpo
rate business; it knew excise taxes had been measured by income; it knew it
had the unrestricted right to select the measure and method of computing the
tax; its knowledge of corporate organization was complete, and from what has
been said, may we import into the law the word “ shares ’’ when the statute reads
"capital stock,” a term when used in connection with corporate taxation is more
frequently held to contemplate the actual holdings and possessions of the corpo
ration, its own property, as opposed to shares of stock? More especially is this
true when the term itself is considered in connection with the express mandate
to include surplus and undivided profits in estimating the tax.
We had prepared and were just on the point of announcing the opinion in this
case when the opinion of the supreme court in Hecht v. Malley reached the court.
The Hecht case, decided May 12, 1924, we think, disposes of this case. The
opinion follows the decision of the circuit court of appeals in Central Union
Trust Co. v. Edwards, supra.
The petition will be dismissed. It is so ordered.
Hay, judge; Downey, judge; and Campbell, chief justice, concur.
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